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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kim J. Day appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor 
under the age of sixteen. Mr. Day now appeals, and he asserts that he was denied his 
right to due process because of a fatal variance between the charging document and 
the jury instructions. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Day's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 




The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The Jury On The Elements Of Lewd 
Conduct 
A. Introduction 
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the elements of lewd conduct - the jury 
was instructed that the State must prove, "the defendant, Kim J. Day, committed an act 
or acts of manual-genital contact or any other lewd or lascivious act upon or with the 
body of [K. S.]. " (Tr., p. 236, L.23 - p.237, L.1 (emphasis added).) Because Mr. Day 
was only charged with manual-genital contact in the Information (R., pp.41-42), the 
italicized language created a fatal variance. It also incorrectly defined lewd conduct, 
essentially allowing Mr. Day to be convicted of lewd conduct for an act that would not 
constitute actual lewd conduct. 
B. The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The JUry On The Elements Of 
Lewd Conduct 
In its response, the State concedes that there was a variance in this case, and 
that, due to S.P.'s testimony, it was, "hypothetically possible that the jury convicted Day 
solely on his contact with K.S.'s breast and not on either his contact with her vaginal 
area, or on her contact with his genitals." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) However, the 
State asserts that Day cannot prevail on appeal because he does meet the second two 
prongs of the Perry test: that there was a clear and obvious error without the need for 
additional information not contained in the appellate record; and the error affected the 
defendant's substantial rights, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the 
error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
226 (2010). The State is incorrect. 
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Regarding the second prong of the Perry test, the State asserts that trial 
counsel's failure to object could have been a tactical decision, because, H[i]f Day's 
counsel determined, based on the factors above, that the possibility of the jury 
convicting Day solely on his touching of K.S.'s breast was extremely remote, she may 
have chose to leave the variance intact for potential appellate reversal should Day be 
convicted." (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) The State's argument fails. 
First, the State would have this Court assume that trial counsel for Mr. Day made 
a tactical decision for Mr. Day to be convicted and incarcerated - clearly not in 
Mr. Day's best interest. Further, trial counsel would also have had to assume that 
appellate counsel for Mr. Day would have spotted the error and raised the claim on 
appeal. 
Additionally, if this Court were to accept this speculation, this Court must also 
accept the speculation that the prosecutor knew that he was seeking a conviction in 
violation of Mr. Day's right to due process and the district court judge recognized that a 
due process right was occurring but decided not to intervene in the hopes that this Court 
would find no error in the district court's decision. 
The State never mentions the prosecutor's or the judge's roles in the failure to 
properly instruct the jury, likely because under its interpretation of Perry, this Court will 
speculate only on whether defense counsel may have "sandbagged" the court. 
However, there is simply no logical reason to hold defense counsel to a higher standard 
than the prosecutor and the district court when the issue is purely a question of what 
elements the State must prove in order to obtain a conviction for the crime charged. 
There is no principle of law in our system of jurisprudence that would punish a 
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defendant for a violation of his rights to due process because all the members of the bar 
involved failed in their duties. The State asks this Court to hold Mr. Day responsible 
because his trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the district court judge ALL failed to 
ensure that the jury was properly instructed on the law. 
And in addition to the State's claim being logically flawed, an identical argument 
has already been rejected by the Court of Appeals. See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 
166 (Ct. App. 2011). The State made the argument in the context of an omitted element 
in a jury instruction being raised for the first time on review. The Court of Appeals 
concluded that there was no indication from the record that the defendant knew more 
about the law than the State or the trial court, nor was there any evidence or indication 
that the defendant was attempting to sandbag the court or that the defendant presented 
the flawed instruction to the district court. Id. Thus, the court concluded that it was left 
only with the State's speculation that the defendant made a tactical decision not to 
object. Id. at 167. The same is true in this case and this Court should reach the same 
conclusion. 
Regarding the third prong of the Perry test, the State asserts that, although it was 
"hypothetically possible that the jury convicted Day solely on his contact with K.S.'s 
breast and not on either his contact with her vaginal area, or on her contact with his 
genitals, Day cannot affirmatively show that this occurred." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.10) (emphasis added). 
Of course, this is not the standard. Mr. Day does not have to affirmatively 
demonstrate that the jury convicted him based on his contact with K.S.'s breasts. 
Obviously, no defendant in Mr. Day's situation could ever meet such a standard 
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because jury deliberations are secret and the jury's rationale for its decision is not part 
of the appellate record. Rather, Mr. Day must only establish that the error affected the 
his substantial rights, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the error 
affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (2010). 
Such a reasonable possibility is present in this case. 
As the State acknowledges, it as possible for the jury to convict Mr. Day solely on 
his contact with K.S.'s breast even though such an act does not amount to lewd 
conduct. (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) While the State suggests that its case focused on 
Mr. Day's alleged touching of K.S.'s vaginal area and her touching of his genitals, only 
three witnesses testified in the State's case in chief. S.P. was one of them, and the only 
inappropriate conduct to which she testified was the touching of K.S.'s breasts; she did 
not testify to see any manual-genital contact. (Tr., p.159, L.17 - p.166, L.14.) Thus, it 
appears that the State called S.P. to testify solely to introduce evidence of inappropriate 
conduct that does not amount to lewd conduct. 
The State also asserts that the evidence that Mr. Day touched K.S.'s breasts 
was, by comparison, weaker, than the evidence of manual-genital contact. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) This is hardly the case. S.P., one of only three witnesses 
during the case in chief, is the one person who corroborated any inappropriate touching, 
and it appears that she was called to testify solely for this purpose. 
Finally, the State asserts that manual-genital contact was the only specific type of 
conduct identified as lewd conduct in the jury instructions and thus the jury must have 
convicted for this conduct. This argument completely overlooks the fact that the jury 
instruction on the elements, which was challenged in this case, specifically permitted 
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the jury to convict Mr. Day for conduct other than manual-genital contact. There is no 
other purpose or effect of the challenged language of the instruction. 
The jury simply could have believed S.P.'s testimony, considered the fact that 
she corroborated K.S.'s allegations, and found that, because this conduct was 
corroborated, it was more likely to have occurred than the other allegations. The jury 
could have given credence to Mr. Day's testimony that, due to his medical condition, he 
would not have intentionally had K.S.'s touch his genitals and that the other manual-
genital contact was merely incidental to the "ice wars" game. There is clearly a 
reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Day requests that his conviction be vacated and his case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 19th day of September, 2012. 
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